Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Siemens, Ferdinand A. von |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 71.2009, 2, p. 486-494
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Subject: | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Rawls-Gerechtigkeitstheorie | Rawls's theory of justice | Austauschtheorie | Social exchange theory | Signalling | Theorie | Theory |
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