Barrière de mobilité et concurrence dans un duopole. Essai de formalisation dans le cadre de la théorie des jeux.
This article takes the following question as a point of departure: if one firm is more efficient than a rival does it have cause to initiate a price war? In order to study the question, we rely on a simple duopoly model and try to make especially heavy use of the concept of barrier to mobility. We are able to show that such factors as relative cost positions, size and degree of market power as well as global elasticity of demand play an important role. Some early results concerning the role of time are obtained on the basis of a comparative static analysis.
Year of publication: |
1986
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Authors: | DEMANGE, Gabrielle ; PONSSARD, Jean-Pierre |
Published in: |
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique. - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE). - 1986, 1, p. 35-53
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Publisher: |
École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE) |
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