Bayesian Decision Theory and the Representation of Beliefs
In this paper, I present a Bayesian decision theory and define choice-based subjective probabilities that faithfully represent Bayesian decision makers’ prior and posterior beliefs regarding the likelihood of the possible effects contingent on his actions. I argue that no equivalent results can be obtained in Savage’s (1954) subjective expected utility theory and give an example illustrating the potential harm caused by ascribing to a decision maker subjective probabilities that do not represent his beliefs.
Year of publication: |
2007-01
|
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Authors: | Karni, Edi |
Institutions: | Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
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