Bayesian Equilibria of Finite Two-Person Games with Incomplete Information
The equivalence of Bayesian equilibria of two-person games with incomplete information and Nash equilibria of certain n-person polymatrix games is demonstrated by means of a specific "Selten model." As a byproduct, constructions recently developed for polymatrix games are available for Bayesian equilibria.
Year of publication: |
1974
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Authors: | Joseph T. Howson, Jr. ; Rosenthal, Robert W. |
Published in: |
Management Science. - Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences - INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909. - Vol. 21.1974, 3, p. 313-315
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Publisher: |
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences - INFORMS |
Saved in:
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