Bayesian Incentive Compatible Parametrization of Mechanisms

We consider a general scheme to construct Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms using a suitable 'variable mechanism parametrization.' The key idea is to perturb a given direct mechanism, which might not be truth revealing, introducing sufficient variability as a function of agents' announcements to generate incentives for truthful revelation. We discuss a variable-price auction in a general setting as an example

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Year of publication:	[2007]
Authors:	Weber, Thomas A.
Other Persons:	Bapna, Abhishek (contributor)
Publisher:	[2007]: [S.l.] : SSRN

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (12 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 2006 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.896553 [DOI]
Classification:	D42 - Monopoly ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012731821