Bayesian Learning without Common Priors and Convergence to Nash Equilibria
Year of publication: |
1992
|
---|---|
Authors: | Nyarko, Y. |
Institutions: | C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of Economics |
Subject: | economic equilibrium | economic models | game theory |
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