Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Min, Daehong |
Published in: |
Economic theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-0479, ZDB-ID 1398355-6. - Vol. 72.2021, 3, p. 743-764
|
Subject: | Communication | Bayesian persuasion | Cheap talk | Imperfect commitment | Kommunikation | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Manipulation | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference | Signalling | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information |
Description of contents: | Description [doi.org] |
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