Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Min, Daehong |
Subject: | Communication | Bayesian persuasion | Cheap talk | Imperfect commitment | Kommunikation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference | Signalling | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Manipulation |
Description of contents: | Description [doi.org] |
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