Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Matysková, Ludmila ; Montes, Alfonso |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 211.2023, p. 1-41
|
Subject: | Bayesian persuasion | Costly information acquisition | Information design | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Informationskosten | Information costs | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information |
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