Behavior of Groups as Players in a Bargaining Experiment. Some Results on Negotiation Processes from a Video Experiment

We report on a two-person bargaining experiment, where both players were represented by groups of three persons each. The discussions within the groups were recorded on video tapes and have been transcribed into text protocols. Analyzing the final payoffs and proposals we got several results that we were able to sustain by means of the text protocols. 1. Groups prefer divisions of the coalition value that correspond to the "equity principle" (Selten 1978, 1987) and are justified by fairness considerations. 2. Payoffs in sessions with low alternatives for strong groups do not differ significantly from payoffs in sessions with high alternatives. 3. Groups try to assert their demands by threats which, however, have no positive effects on negotiations. 4. Subjects don't behave according to strategies in the game theoretic sense. But they have "strategic ideas" how to achieve their bargaining goal resulting in distinguishable negotiation patterns.