"Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory"

This paper incorporates behavioral economics into implementation theory. We use mechanisms that are strictly detail-free. We assume that each agent dislikes telling a white lie when such lying does not serve her/his material interest. We present a permissive result wherein by using just a single detail-free mechanism, any alternative can be uniquely implemented in iterative dominance as long as the agents regard this alternative as being socially desirable.

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Year of publication:	2007-10
Authors:	Matsushima, Hitoshi
Institutions:	Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy (CIRJE), Faculty of Economics

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CIRJE F-Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number CIRJE-F-523 13 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005465274