Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Fehr, Ernst ; Powell, Michael ; Wilkening, Tom |
Published in: |
American Economic Review. - Pittsburgh, PA : American Economic Association, ISSN 1944-7981. - Vol. 111.2021, 4, p. 1055-1091
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Publisher: |
Pittsburgh, PA : American Economic Association |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.1257/aer.20170297 [DOI] hdl:10419/268433 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:espost:268433 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; D91 - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving |
Source: |
-
Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems
Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, (2011)
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All-pay auctions with handicaps
Kitahara, Minoru, (2010)
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Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget
Burkett, Justin, (2016)
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Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms
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Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
Fehr, Ernst, (2014)
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Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
Fehr, Ernst, (2014)
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