Behavioral Real Options, Financial Literacy, and Investor's Inertia

I study a real-options model where the investor computes the value of a project (VOP) from available data. In the process, she makes mistakes, as she suffers from over-confidence and inference biases. I study how the optimal investment rule and timing depend on investors' biases. I show that the biases make the investor systematically underestimate the VOP, which leads to a wait-and-see approach: at the VOP at which a rational investor optimally exercises the option, the biased one is still unconvinced and waits for a more extreme valuation. Finally, I show that the wait-and-see approach explains the documented relationship between financial literacy and investors' inertia (investors with a poor understanding of financial concepts exhibit long inactivity spells). I use this relationship to show how an information provider can profit by strategically deciding the complexity of the information she sends to the investor