Behind the council agenda: The commission's impact on decisions
This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion about the scope for autonomous action of supranational organizations in the European Union, focussing on the European Commission. In the literature, the independence of the Commission is frequently questioned, while the relative autonomy of the European Court of Justice is less contentious. The Commission's power is largely related - and restricted - to its role as an agenda-setter. Particular emphasis is accorded to its agenda-setting powers as an avenue of influence. What has so far been seldom recognized is how the Commission can profit from its specific role in the supranational legal system. I present empirical evidence showing how the Commission can take advantage of the supremacy of European law, and force the Council to act. Thereby it manages to influence the course of European integration largely independently, benefitting from the greater autonomy of the European Court.
Year of publication: |
1997
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Authors: | Schmidt, Susanne K. |
Institutions: | Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | MPIfG Discussion Paper. - ISSN 1864-4325. |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | German |
Notes: | Number 97/4 |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008805730
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