Belief-free communication equilibria in repeated games
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Tomala, Tristan |
Published in: |
Mathematics of operations research. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0364-765X, ZDB-ID 195683-8. - Vol. 38.2013, 4, p. 617-637
|
Subject: | repeated games | incomplete information imperfect monitoring | communication equilibrium | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Kommunikation | Communication | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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