Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence

We generalize the results of Hörner and Lovo (2009) [15] to N-player games with arbitrary information structure. First, we characterize the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs under low discounting as the set of feasible payoffs that are individually rational, jointly rational, and incentive compatible. Second, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Hörner, Johannes ; Lovo, Stefano ; Tomala, Tristan
Published in:	Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 146.2011, 5, p. 1770-1795
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Repeated game with incomplete information Harsanyi doctrine Belief-free equilibria

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318595