Belief Free Incomplete Information Games

We consider the following belief free solution concepts for games with incomplete information: (i) incomplete information rationalizability, (ii) incomplete information correlated equilibrium and (iii) ex post equilibrium. We present epistemic foundations for these solution concepts and establish relationships between them. The properties of these solution concepts are further developed in supermodular games and potential games.

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Year of publication:	2007-09
Authors:	Bergemann, Dirk ; Morris, Stephen
Institutions:	Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Subject:	Correlated equilibrium \| Rationalizability \| Ex post equilibrium \| Belief free types \| Payo types \| Belief types \| Supermodular games \| Potential games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The price is None Number 1629 27 pages
Classification:	C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593650