Beliefs in repeated games
John H. Nachbar
| Year of publication: |
Sept. 2003 ; [Elektronische Ressource]
|
|---|---|
| Other Persons: | Nachbar, John Haines (contributor) |
| Institutions: | Shakai-Keizai-Kenkyūsho <Osaka> (contributor) |
| Publisher: |
Osaka : Inst. of Social and Economic Research |
| Subject: | Belief-Funktion | Lernprozess | Learning process | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Theorie | Theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
freely available
| Extent: | Online-Ressource, 26 p., text |
|---|---|
| Series: | Discussion paper / Institute of Social and Economic Research. - Osaka : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2435-0982, ZDB-ID 2106942-6. - Vol. 597 |
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat reader Consider a two-player discounted infinitely repeated game. A player’s belief is a probability distribution over the opponent’s repeated game strategies. This paper shows that, for a large class of repeated games, there are no beliefs that satisfy three conditions, learnability, consistency, and a diversity condition, CS. This impossibility theorem generalizes results in Nachbar (1997). -- Bayesian learning ; repeated games |
| Other identifiers: | hdl:10419/92598 [Handle] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001803422