Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity constraints
We examine Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity constraints, demonstrating that the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium constitutes an interval. We then examine the properties of this set as (a) the number of firms becomes large and (b) the capacity cost increases.
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Roy Chowdhury, Prabal |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 103.2009, 1, p. 55-58
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Bertrand competition Capacity constraint |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Multi-person Bargaining With Complementarity: Is There Holdout?
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, (2008)
-
Joint venture instability: a life cycle approach
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, (2001)
-
Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance
Chowdhury, Shyamal, (2014)
- More ...