Best-of-three all-pay auctions

We study a best-of-three all-pay auction. It is shown that with values of winning and without values of losing, this auction is less productive (the players' total expected effort is smaller) than the one-stage all-pay auction. However, with different values of losing over the contest's stages it may be more productive than the one-stage all-pay auction.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Sela, Aner
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 112.2011, 1, p. 67-70
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Multi-stage contests Best-of-three contests All-pay auctions

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009146120