Better borrowers, fewer banks?
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Godlewski, Christophe J. ; Lobez, Frédéric ; Statnik, Jean-Christophe |
Institutions: | Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion (LaRGE), Institut de Finance de Strasbourg |
Subject: | Bank lending | borrower quality | multiple banking | number of lenders | signaling | Europe |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages ; G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure |
Source: |
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