Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment
This paper analyzes a model in which owners of competing firms can hire biased managers for strategic reasons. We show that independent of the mode of competition, that is, price or quantities, owners hire aggressive managers. This result contrasts with the classic literature on strategic delegation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Englmaier, Florian ; Reisinger, Markus |
Published in: |
Managerial and Decision Economics. - John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., ISSN 0143-6570. - Vol. 35.2014, 5, p. 350-356
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Publisher: |
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
Saved in:
freely available
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