Biased Managers, Organizational Design, and Incentive Provision

We model the tradeoff between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix organizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high

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Year of publication:	[2005]
Authors:	Costa, Cristiano M.
Other Persons:	Ferreira, Daniel (contributor) ; Moreira, Humberto (contributor)
Publisher:	[2005]: [S.l.] : SSRN

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (11 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 21, 2004 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.593963 [DOI]
Classification:	L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; M11 - Production Management
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012737266