Biased monitors : corporate governance when managerial ability is mis-assessed
Year of publication: |
2018
|
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Authors: | Hermalin, Benjamin E. |
Published in: |
Journal of the Japanese and international economies : an international journal ; JJIE. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0889-1583, ZDB-ID 626389-6. - Vol. 47.2018, p. 70-80
|
Subject: | Career concerns | Cognitive biases | Corporate governance | Learning and assessment | Corporate Governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Kognition | Cognition | Systematischer Fehler | Bias | Karriereplanung | Career development | Erwerbsverlauf | Occupational attainment | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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