Bid-Ask Spreads with Indirect Competition Among Specialists
Research Joint Ventures and subsidies are important R&D policy instruments. The regulator, however, is unlikely to know all the relevant information to regulate R&D optimally. The extent to which there are appropriability problems is one such variable that is private information to the firms within the industry. In a duopoly setting we analyze the characteristics of a first-best and second-best R&D policy where the government can either allow Research Joint Ventures or not and give lump-sum subisides to the parties involved. The second-best R&D policy improves upon the policy of an unsophisicated government by integrating reports of the firms on their spillovers and the correlation between the R&D spillovers of the firms into its formulation.
Year of publication: |
1994
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Authors: | Gehrig, Thomas ; Jackson, Matthew |
Publisher: |
Evanston, IL : Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |
Saved in:
freely available
Series: | Discussion Paper ; 1107 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | hdl:10419/221463 [Handle] RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1107 [RePEc] |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012235919
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