Bid Sensitivity in the Structure of the Vickrey Auction
A research study explored a version of economist W. Vickrey's second-price, sealed-bid auction used for the valuation of nonmarket goods. The sensitivity of revealed values generated by this variation were examined. A standard second-price auction with repeated market trials was compared to a random nth-price auction and a combinatorial private-collection auction with sequentially-revealed values. Results showed the consistency of revealed values in a low probability risk scenario.
Year of publication: |
1994-12-01
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Authors: | Shogren, Jason F. ; Fox, John A. ; Hayes, Dermot J. ; Kliebenstein, James |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, Iowa State University |
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