Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions : an experimental study

Werner Güth; Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel; Elmar Wolfstetter

We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders’ preference for first- vs. second–price auctions. -- Experiments ; Sealed Bid Auctions ; Asymmetric Bidders ; Private-Independent Values

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Güth, Werner ; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta ; Wolfstetter, Elmar
Institutions:	Sonderforschungsbereich Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse (contributor)
Publisher:	Berlin : Humboldt-Universität
Subject:	Experiment \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 30 S., 356,87 KB) graph. Darst.
Series:	Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373. - Berlin : Humboldt-Universität, ISSN 1436-1086, ZDB-ID 2135319-0. - Vol. 2001,15
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/62694 [Handle]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612559