Bidding for the unemployed: An application of mechanism design to welfare-to-work programs
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Onderstal, Sander |
Published in: |
European economic review : EER. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0014-2921, ZDB-ID 2079690. - Vol. 53.2009, 6, p. 715
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