Bidding Rings in Repeated Auctions.

This paper considers the question of tacit collusion in repeated auctions with independent private values. McAfee and McMillan show that the extent of collusion is limited by the availability of transfers. If no transfers are possible, the private information of bidders precludes any collusive scheme beyond bid rotation (BRS), even when the cartel has unlimited enforcement.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Skrzypacz, A. ; Hopenhayn, H.
Institutions:	University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER)
Subject:	AUCTIONS \| UNCERTAINTY \| BIDDING

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	RCER Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 463 30 pages
Classification:	D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200775