BIDDING TO GIVE: AN EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF AUCTIONS FOR CHARITY
We experimentally compare three mechanisms used to raise money for charities: first-price winner-pay auctions, first-price all-pay auctions, and lotteries. We stay close to the characteristics of most charity auctions by using an environment with incomplete information and independent private values. Our results support theoretical predictions by showing that the all-pay format raises substantially higher revenue than the other mechanisms. Copyright © (2009) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Schram, Arthur J.H.C. ; Onderstal, Sander |
Published in: |
International Economic Review. - Department of Economics. - Vol. 50.2009, 2, p. 431-457
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Publisher: |
Department of Economics |
Saved in:
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