Bilanzskandale - Eine institutionenökonomische Analyse
In this paper, recent accounting scandals in Germany are traced back to a serious incentive problem in German auditing law. Since the auditor depends economically on his client, contrary to the legislator's intention, a factual forcing contract is established which enables the client to control his auditor's performance almost completely. As a solution to this problem the proposal of a Demsetz auction of the auditing monopoly is developed, including a mandatory rotation of auditing firms. I shall argue that this proposal not only alleviates the problem of auditing fraud in an incentive-compatible way but may also serve as an effective barrier against concentration in the auditing market. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2004
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Müller, Christian |
Published in: |
Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik. - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS. - Vol. 5.2004, 2, p. 211-225
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Publisher: |
Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS |
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