Board bias, information, and investment efficiency
Year of publication: |
2024
|
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Authors: | Gregor, Martin ; Michaeli, Beatrice |
Publisher: |
Prague : Charles University in Prague, Institute of Economic Studies (IES) |
Subject: | Empire-building | biased board | underinvestment | overinvestment | endogenous information |
Series: | IES Working Paper ; 11/2024 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 1885094388 [GVK] |
Classification: | D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General ; G31 - Capital Budgeting; Investment Policy ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance |
Source: |
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