Board of director collusion, managerial incentives and firm values

Rainer Andergassen

This paper investigates the effects of board of director collusion on managerial incentives and firm values. Recent academic research hints at the social network of board of directors as an important conduit for coordinating corporate governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing competition. We study a model where managers can exert unobservable cost-cutting effort and investigate the consequences of and the incentives for coordinating managerial pay among corporate boards.

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Year of publication:	October 27, 2011
Authors:	Andergassen, Rainer
Publisher:	Bologna, Italy : Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Department of Economics
Subject:	Board of director collusion \| managerial incentives \| pay-for-performance sensitivity \| firm values \| managerial pay \| Unternehmenswert \| Firm value \| Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Vorstand \| Executive board \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Corporate Governance \| Corporate governance \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Wettbewerbsbeschränkung \| Restraints of competition \| Managervergütung \| Executive compensation \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Theorie \| Theory \| Board of Directors \| Board of directors \| Vergütungssystem \| Compensation system \| Unternehmenserfolg \| Firm performance \| Eigentümerstruktur \| Ownership structure

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 27 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Quaderni - working paper DSE / Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Department of Economics. - Bologna : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2282-6483, ZDB-ID 2125055-8. - Vol. no 795
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4443 [DOI] hdl:10419/159634 [Handle]
Classification:	L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs)
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011734901