"Board's Monitoring and Retention of Sub-standard and Powerless CEOs"

Do corporate boards look after shareholder interests? This paper shows that CEO replacement may exhibit excessive inertia, in favor of the incumbent board of directors. I show that even when there is no relationship between the board of directors and CEO, or no threat of the CEO.s power over the board of directors, there is a case in which the board wants to keep sub-standard CEOs.

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Year of publication:	2010-01
Authors:	Sato, Meg
Institutions:	Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy (CIRJE), Faculty of Economics

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Series:	CIRJE F-Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number CIRJE-F-711 10 pages longages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008497861