Board structure, mergers, and shareholder wealth: a study of the mutual fund industry
We study mutual fund mergers between 1999 and 2001 to understand the role and effectiveness of fund boards. Some fund mergers—typically across-family mergers—benefit target shareholders but are costly to target fund directors. Such mergers are more likely when funds underperform and their boards have a larger percentage of independent trustees, suggesting that more-independent boards tolerate less underperformance before initiating across-family mergers. This effect is most pronounced when all of the fund's directors are independent, not the 75% level of independence required by the SEC. Higher-paid target fund boards are less likely to approve across-family mergers that cause substantial reductions in their compensation.
Year of publication: |
2006-06
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Authors: | Tufano, Peter ; Khorana, Ajay ; Wedge, Lei |
Publisher: |
Harvard Business School Working Paper |
Saved in:
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