Bonus and Malus in Principal-Agent Relations with Fixed Pay and Real Effort
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kirstein, Annette |
Published in: |
Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr). - Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaft. - Vol. 60.2008, 3, p. 280-303
|
Publisher: |
Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaft |
Subject: | Experiments | Fixed Wage | Moral Hazard | Principal-Agent Theory | Real Effort | Reward | Punishment |
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Discussion of Bonus and Malus in Principal Agent Relations with Fixed Pay and Real Effort
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Bonus and Malus in Principal-Agent Relations with Fixed Pay and Real Effort
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