Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: A theoretical approach

We analyse bonus payments for officials, who transfer payments truthfully to the government rather than collecting bribes. We show that optimised bonus payments are always beneficial to the government, making them a more effective anti-corruption measure than simple wage increases.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Cracau, Daniel ; Franz, Benjamin
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 120.2013, 1, p. 1-4
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Corruption \| Principal–agent game \| Monetary incentives

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs ; K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665681