Borrower Targeting under Microfinance Competition with Motivated Microfinance Institutions and Strategic Complementarity
type="main"> <p>We examine how increased competition among motivated microfinance institutions (MFIs) impacts the poorest borrowers' access to microfinance. We find that competition depends on inequality, technology, and the possibility of double-dipping (borrowing from several sources). Without competition, even a motivated MFI may lend to the not-so-poor in preference to poor borrowers. If double-dipping is feasible, competition may encourage lending to the poor. The presence of double-dipping is critical for MFI competition to have a positive effect. When double-dipping is feasible, MFI coordination may worsen borrower targeting whenever inequality is intermediate. We discuss policy implications dealing with double-dipping, MFI coordination, and competition.
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Guha, Brishti ; Chowdhury, Prabal Roy |
Published in: |
The Developing Economies. - Institute of Developing Economies. - Vol. 52.2014, 3, p. 211-240
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Publisher: |
Institute of Developing Economies |
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