Bounded rationality in differential games

Klaus B. Beckmann

The present paper proposes a myopic, boundedly rational heuristic for individual decision-making in differential game settings. I demonstrate that this type of behaviour converges to Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated stage games without a state variable if the stage game is strategically symmetric. Two examples are used to illustrate the application of the heuristic in differential games.

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Beckmann, Klaus
Publisher:	Hamburg : Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg, Department of Economics
Subject:	differential games \| simulation \| bounded rationality \| Begrenzte Rationalität \| Bounded rationality \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Simulation \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 16 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Diskussionspapier / Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre. - Hamburg : Helmut-Schmidt-Univ., Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre, ZDB-ID 2117627-9. - Vol. Nr./no. 178 (December 2017)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/184875 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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