Bribery and favoritism by auctioneers in sealed-bid auctions
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Other Persons: | Burguet, Roberto (contributor) ; Perry, Martin Kent (contributor) |
Published in: |
The B.E. journal of theoretical economics. - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704, ZDB-ID 2268339-2. - Vol. 7.2007, 1, p. 1-25
|
Subject: | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract | Auktion | Auction | Korruption | Corruption | Theorie | Theory |
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