Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline

We present a framework of investigation into the political economy of the budget process. Our model suggests that institutional rules governing the budget process can be found to limit the importance of fiscal illusion. Empirical evidence supports that proposition. The choice of rules depends on the political environment as well as the dominant source of uncertainty in the budget process.

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Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	von Hagen, Jürgen ; Harden, Ian J.
Published in:	Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital. - ISSN 2199-1235. - Vol. 52.2019, 4, p. 527-536
Publisher:	Berlin : Duncker & Humblot
Subject:	Budget systems \| Government expenditures and deficits \| Collective choice

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3790/ccm.52.4.527 [DOI]
Classification:	H61 - Budget; Budget Systems ; H62 - Deficit; Surplus ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; H72 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014523753