Bundling as an Entry Barrier
In this paper we look at the case for bundling in an oligopolistic environment. We show that bundling is a particularly effective entry-deterrent strategy. A company that has market power in two goods, A and B , can, by bundling them together, make it harder for a rival with only one of these goods to enter the market. Bundling allows an incumbent to credibly defend both products without having to price low in each. The traditional explanation for bundling that economists have given is that it serves as an effective tool of price discrimination by a monopolist. Although price discrimination provides a reason to bundle, the gains are small compared with the gains from the entry-deterrent effect. © 2004 the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Nalebuff, Barry |
Published in: |
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. - MIT Press. - Vol. 119.2004, 1, p. 159-187
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Publisher: |
MIT Press |
Saved in:
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