Buying Security with Charity : Why donors change conditionality

This paper explores how relations between donors and sub-Saharan countries have evolved since 1961 when ODA was first defined, what drives the dynamics and how this influences poverty eradication. We argue that ODA is a multi-purpose vehicle which tries to combine poverty alleviation in poor countries with financing of the foreign policy objectives of donor countries. Western security concerns have influenced conditionality for ODA, affecting allocations and delivery of aid, and have altered its definition. OECD countries have been buying security with charity and have been able to align their security considerations with the moral of charity as security threats to Western countries have often also been real threats to Africa. This is not the case for migration to Europe, which is neither a security nor a welfare problem for Africa. African welfare and poverty alleviation objectives cannot be aligned with Western demands to stem the flow of young people out of Africa. While aid can still help, if the overall envelope does not increase, it will be at the expense of other poor people. When Europe cannot justify migration control as charity, and there is no common security agenda, donor governments risk using aid as a bribe to buy African governments’ assistance to control migration, which is not in Africa’s interest. ODA flows are moving to the north of Africa and to Europe’s neighbors. This is because some countries can offer security alliances to the West, which it can buy through aid budgets if there is a degree of misery in those countries. Africa needs unity to undertake well-coordinated trading of services, which Europe is prepared to pay generously for. This would be better for Africa’s welfare than having to accept conditional charity with gratitude and would help European countries to address the real problem and stop treating the symptoms. This would also be the better route to follow for Europe’s children