Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies
Year of publication: |
2002
|
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Authors: | Prat, Andrea |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 103.2002, 1, p. 162-189
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Subject: | Politikfinanzierung | Political finance | Politiker | Politicians | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Interessenvertretung | Interest group | Theorie | Theory |
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