Can agents be better off with pay caps?
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chou, Eric S. ; Chen, Chien-Lung |
Published in: |
The Scandinavian journal of economics. - Oxford : Wiley, ISSN 0347-0520, ZDB-ID 8170-X. - Vol. 117.2015, 4, p. 1069-1090
|
Subject: | Executive compensation | incentive contracts | limited liability | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Managervergütung | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Beschränkte Haftung | Limited liability | Großbritannien | United Kingdom |
-
Does improved information improve incentives?
Chaigneau, Pierre, (2018)
-
Optimale Anreizverträge : Theorie, Vertragsstruktur und beschränkte Haftung
Henze, Frank, (2005)
-
Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective : the role of stock grants
Hili, Amal, (2016)
- More ...
-
Hierarchy design with socialism in internal capital markets
Chou, Eric S., (2008)
-
The boundaries of the firms for human-capital-intensive industries
Chou, Eric S., (2003)
-
The boundaries of firms as information barriers
Chou, Eric S., (2007)
- More ...