Can auctions control market power in emissions trading markets.
Using eight sessions (twenty-four ten-period markets) in a double ABA cross-over design, we demonstrate clear evidence of market power in double-auction emission trading markets (agents who are not constrained to only buy or sell). Conventional theory predicts that in half of the market-power environments monopsony should emerge and in half monopoly should emerge. Market-power outcomes are frequently observed, most often in the form of price discrimination, and most effectively by monopsonists.
Year of publication: |
1999-12
|
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Authors: | Muller, R. Andrew ; Mestelman, Stuart ; Spraggon, John ; Godby, Rob |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, McMaster University |
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