Can investors restrict managerial behavior in distressed firms?
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Pryshchepa, Oksana ; Aretz, Kevin ; Banerjee, Shantanu |
Published in: |
The journal of corporate finance : contracting, governance and organization. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0929-1199, ZDB-ID 1189269-9. - Vol. 23.2013, p. 222-239
|
Subject: | Agency conflicts | Financial distress | Firm investment | Expected volatility | Theorie | Theory | Insolvenz | Insolvency | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Volatilität | Volatility |
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