Can Partial Fiscal Coordination Be Welfare Worsening? A model of tax competition

Most work on tax competition argues that mobile factors tend to be undertaxed except if there is coordination of tax policies. Full coordination is not however always feasible, and as a consequence some measures of partial coordination have been proposed such as minimal witholding taxes on interest income. We show that partial coordination can be in some instances welfare worsening and that then no coordination is to be preferred.

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Marchand, Maurice ; Pestieau, Pierre ; Sato, Motohiro
Institutions:	Centre de Recherche en Économie Publique et de la Population (CREPP), HEC École de Gestion
Subject:	tax competition \| tax coordination \| witholding tax

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CREPP Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue ; H87 - International Fiscal Issues ; H7 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005464250