Can paying politicians well reduce corruption? : the effects of wages and uncertainty on electoral competition
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Heggedal, Tom-Reiel ; Helland, Leif ; Morton, Rebecca B. |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 135.2022, p. 60-73
|
Subject: | Electoral competition | Laboratory experiment | Political rents | Korruption | Corruption | Lohn | Wages | Experiment | Wahlkampf | Electoral campaign | Politiker | Politicians | Rent-Seeking | Rent seeking | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | Economic theory of democracy | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour |
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