Can Relational Contracts Survive Stochastic Interruptions? Experimental Evidence
Year of publication: |
2010-06
|
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Authors: | Camerer, Colin ; Linardi, Sera |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh |
Subject: | experiments | labor market | relational contracts | organizational design | layoffs |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 483 49 pages |
Classification: | C9 - Design of Experiments ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; E24 - Employment; Unemployment; Wages ; J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets |
Source: |
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