Can subgame perfect equilibrium threats foster cooperation? : an experimental test of finite-horizon folk theorems
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Angelova, Vera ; Bruttel, Lisa Verena ; Güth, Werner ; Kamecke, Ulrich |
Published in: |
Economic inquiry : journal of the Western Economic Association International. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0095-2583, ZDB-ID 191139-9. - Vol. 51.2013, 2, p. 1345-1356
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Subject: | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Gefangenendilemma | Prisoner's dilemma | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Verhaltensökonomik | Behavioral economics |
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